

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 10-1062 (ESH-HHK)

**ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
in his official capacity as
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES,**

Defendant,

and,

**TYRONE BROOKS; GEORGIA
ASSOCIATION OF BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS; EDWARD O. DUBOSE;
GEORGIA STATE CONFERENCE
NAACP; HELEN BUTLER; and GEORGIA
COALITION FOR THE PEOPLES'
AGENDA,**

Applicants to Intervene.

**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS
DEFENDANTS**

I. Introduction

This action was brought by the State of Georgia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c seeking preclearance of a voter verification process previously objected to by the Department of Justice under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Alternatively, Georgia seeks a declaration that Section 5 is unconstitutional and that its enforcement be permanently enjoined.

Applicants Tyrone Brooks, Edward O. DuBose, and Helen Butler are African American

residents and registered voters of Georgia.

Applicant Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials (“GABEO”) has more than 700 members statewide. Its main focus is on developing programs which will provide deterrents to violence and crime among youth; promoting voter registration, education and participation; forming literacy programs to battle the growing problem of illiteracy in the state; securing economic parity for all Georgians; and preserving minority voting strength.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) was founded in 1909 and is the Nation’s oldest, largest and most widely recognized grassroots-based civil rights organization. The mission of the NAACP is to ensure the political, educational, social and economic equality of all citizens; to achieve equality of rights and eliminate race prejudice among citizens of the United States; to remove all barriers of racial discrimination through democratic processes; and to seek the enactment, enforcement and the proper construction of federal, state and local laws securing civil rights.

The purpose of applicant Georgia State Conference of the NAACP (“Georgia NAACP”) is to implement the mission of the NAACP within Georgia. The NAACP has worked to protect voting rights through litigation, advocacy, legislation, and communications, including work to promote voter registration, voter education, get out the vote efforts, election protection, and census participation and redistricting. The Georgia NAACP has 63 branches in the State of Georgia. Applicant Georgia NAACP was a plaintiff in *Morales v. Kemp*, Civ. No. 1:08-CV-3172 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2008) (three-judge court), which granted a preliminary injunction against Georgia’s use of its non-precleared voter verification process. Plaintiffs in *Morales* also urged the Department of Justice to object to Georgia’s voter verification process when it was

submitted for preclearance.

Applicant Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda is an organized group of representatives from all of the major civil rights/human rights/peace and justice organization in Georgia, plus concerned people of conscience. Its mission is to improve the quality of governance in Georgia; to help create a more informed and active electorate; and to have responsive and accountable elected officials.

All applicants have moved the Court for leave to intervene as of right and for permissive intervention pursuant to Rules 24(a)(1) and (2) and (b)(1) (A) and (B), F.R.Civ.P. The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rivate parties may intervene in §5 actions,” and that such intervention is controlled by Rule 24. *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. 461, 477 (2003); *accord NAACP v. New York*, 413 U.S. 345, 367 (1973).

II. Intervention As of Right Is Warranted

Rule 24(a) provides:

On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.

As an initial matter, the application for intervention is timely. Plaintiff filed its Complaint on June 21, 2020. The Attorney General's answer has not yet been filed. Although the Court has directed the parties to submit a Joint Status Report on July 7, 2010, and has set a scheduling conference for July 9, 2010, no discovery has been undertaken, no dispositive orders have been entered in the case, and no trial has been set or held. Granting intervention would not, therefore, cause any delay in the trial of the case nor prejudice the rights of any existing party. *See Bossier*

Parish School Board v. Reno, 157 F.R.D. 133, 135 (D.D.C. 1994) (intervention granted as timely where motion was filed on the same day the court held its first status conference).

The most important factor in determining whether intervention is timely is whether any delay in seeking intervention will prejudice the existing parties to the case. *See, e.g., McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co.*, 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[i]n fact, this may well be the only significant consideration when the proposed intervenor seeks intervention of right”).¹ Where intervention will not delay resolution of the litigation, intervention should be allowed, provided that the proposed intervenor satisfies the criteria of Rule 24(a). *Texas v. United States*, 802 F. Supp. 481, 482 n.1 (D.D.C. 1992) (affirming the propriety of granting intervention); *Cummings v. United States*, 704 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1983) (it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny intervention in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the government).

A. Intervention under Rule 24(a)(1)

A statute of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4), provides that “[a]ny aggrieved party may as of right intervene at any stage in such action [to bailout from Section 5 coverage].” Since Georgia is seeking a declaration that Section 5 is unconstitutional, which is the functional equivalent of bail out, intervention in this action should be granted of right. Granting intervention would also serve the underlying purpose of § 1973b(a)(4) of providing an “aggrieved party” the opportunity to be heard when a jurisdiction is seeking to terminate Section 5 coverage.

B. Intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)

¹ Prejudice should not, of course, be confused with the convenience of the parties. *See McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co.*, 430 F.2d at 1073 (“mere inconvenience is not in itself a sufficient reason to reject as untimely a motion to intervene as of right”); *Clark v. Putnam County*, 168 F.3d 458, 462 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).

Movants also meet the standards for intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2).

1. Applicants Have a Direct Interest in Preclearance and the Constitutionality of Section 5

As racial minorities protected by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and as registered voters who reside in Georgia, the individual applicants plainly have a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the “transaction that is the subject of the action,” Rule 24(a)(2), *i.e.*, preclearance of a voter verification process previously objected to by the Department of Justice under Section 5, and the constitutionality of Section 5. Because of the importance of these interests, intervention in Section 5 cases is favored and the courts have routinely allowed it. *See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder*, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting multiple motions to intervene presented by African-American, Latino and other minority voters in case seeking bailout under Section 4(a) of the VRA and challenging the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA); *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 539 U.S. at 477; *Busbee v. Smith*, 549 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982); *City of Lockhart v. United States*, 460 U.S. 125, 129 (1983); *City of Port Arthur, Texas v. United States*, 517 F.Supp. 987, 991 n.2 (D.D.C. 1981); *New York State v. United States*, 65 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1974); *City of Richmond, Virginia v. United States*, 376 F.Supp. 1344, 1349 n.23 (D.D.C. 1974); *Beer v. United States*, 374 F.Supp. 363, 367 n.5 (D.D.C. 1974); *Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States*, 386 F.Supp. 1319, 1321 (D.D.C. 1974); *City of Petersburg, Virginia v. United States*, 354 F.Supp. 1021, 1024 (D.D.C. 1972).² *See also Clark v. Putnam County*, 168 F.3d 458, 462 (11th Cir. 1999) (“black voters had a right to intervene” in action challenging county redistricting, and listing recent

2 In some of the cases cited above intervenors played not merely an important but a crucial role. In *City of Lockhart*, for example, the intervenors presented the sole argument in the Supreme Court on behalf of the appellees. No argument was presented on behalf of the United States. *See* 460 U.S. at 130.

voting cases allowing intervention); *Burton v. Sheheen*, 793 F.Supp 1329, 1338 (D.S.C. 1992); *Brooks v. State Board of Elections*, 838 F.Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. Ga. 1993); *Johnson v. Mortham*, 915 F.Supp. 1529, 1536 (D.C. Fla. 1995) (registered voters had “a sufficiently substantial interest to intervene” in a suit challenging congressional redistricting); *Baker v. Regional High School District No. 5*, 432 F.Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1977) (residents of school district had an interest in method of electing school board that entitled them to intervene in apportionment challenge).

The Eleventh Circuit, in reversing a district court denial of intervention to county residents in a voting rights case, articulated the substantial, legally protected interests of voters in their election system:

intervenors sought to vindicate important personal interest in maintaining the election system that governed their exercise of political power As such, they alleged a tangible actual or prospective injury.

Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1993).

Intervention is particularly appropriate in this case because applicants, unlike the defendant, include residents and voters of Georgia and three civil rights organization that engage in voter registration and education and whose constituents and members include residents and voters of Georgia and are therefore in a special position to provide the Court with a local appraisal of the facts and circumstances involved in the litigation. In *County Council of Sumter County v. United States*, 555 F.Supp. 694, 697 (D.D.C. 1983), the court allowed African American citizens to intervene in a Section 5 preclearance action in part specifically because of their “local perspective on the current and historical facts at issue.”

In addition, and as noted above, applicant Georgia NAACP was a plaintiff in *Morales v.*

Kemp, which granted a preliminary injunction against Georgia’s use of its unprecleared voter verification process. Plaintiffs in *Morales* also urged the Department of Justice to object to Georgia’s voter verification process when it was submitted for preclearance.

Applicants have an interest in the subject matter of this action sufficient to warrant intervention. Indeed, as voters of Georgia, no individuals or entity could have a greater interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

2. Applicants’ Ability to Protect Their Interests Will Be Impaired or Impeded if Intervention Is Denied

The outcome of this action may, as both a legal and practical matter, impair or impede applicants’ ability to protect their interests, thus satisfying Rule 24(a)(2). If Georgia’s voter verification process is precleared, racial and language minorities will be disproportionately and adversely affected. In addition, if Section 5 is found to be unconstitutional intervenors would be denied the protection of preclearance. The State of Georgia and all its subdivisions would then be free to enact changes in their voting practices and procedures without first showing that the changes did not have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race or color or membership in a language minority.

3. Applicants’ Interests Cannot Be Adequately Represented by the Existing Parties

Applicants can satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)'s inadequate representation requirement by showing merely that representation of their interests “‘*may be*’ inadequate” and “‘the burden of making this showing should be treated as ‘*minimal*.’” *United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia Sav. Fund*, 819 F.2d 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting *Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America*, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10 (1972)) (emphasis by the *United Guaranty* court); *see also In re Sierra Club*, 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1991) (same). This Court has held that

Rule 24 “underscores both the burden of those opposing intervention to show the adequacy of the existing representation and the need for a liberal application in favor of permitting intervention.” *Nuesse v. Camp*, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967); *see also Smuck v. Hobson*, 408 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (same).

Although the Attorney General and the applicants for intervention “may share some objectives” with respect to Georgia’s voter verification process and the constitutionality of Section 5, *In re Sierra Club*, 945 F.2d at 780, that does not mean that the Attorney General’s interests and applicants’ interests are identical or that their approaches to litigation would be the same. As *City of Lockhart* demonstrates, the government and minorities have sometimes disagreed on the proper application of the Voting Rights Act and what constitutes adequate protection of voting rights. *See also Blanding v. DuBose*, 454 U.S. 393, 398-399 (1982) (minority plaintiffs, but not the United States, appealed and prevailed in the Supreme Court in voting rights case); *County Council of Sumter County*, 555 F.Supp. at 696 (United States and minority intervenors took opposite positions regarding the application of Section 2 to Section 5 preclearance).

The Supreme Court has “recognized that when a party to an existing suit is obligated to serve two distinct interests, which, although related, are not identical, another with one of those interests should be entitled to intervene.” *United Guaranty Residential Insurance*, 819 F.2d at 475 (referring to *Trbovich*, 404 U.S. at 538-539). In *Trbovich*, the Supreme Court allowed a union member to intervene in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to set aside union elections for violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, even though the Secretary was broadly charged with protecting the public interest. The Court

reasoned that the Secretary of Labor could not adequately represent the union member because the Secretary had a “duty to serve two distinct interests,” 404 U.S. at 539, a duty to protect both the public interest and the rights of union members.

In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit allowed an environmental group to intervene as a party defendant in an action where the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) was defending the constitutionality of a state regulation governing the issuance of permits for hazardous waste facilities. The court reasoned that DHEC could not adequately represent the environmental group because “in theory, [DHEC] should represent all of the citizens of the state, including the interests of those citizens who may be . . . proponents of new hazardous waste facilities,” *In re Sierra Club*, 945 F.2d at 780, while the environmental group “on the other hand, appears to represent only a subset of citizens concerned with hazardous waste those who would prefer that few or no new hazardous waste facilities receive permits.” *Id.*

Applicants’ interests in this litigation are, in like fashion, sufficiently different from those of the United States to justify intervention. The United States must represent the interests of its citizenry generally - including the interests of the plaintiff. *Trbovich*, 404 U.S. at 538-39; *In re Sierra Club*, 945 F.2d at 780. Where a party represents such dual interests in litigation, the “test” of whether that party will adequately represent the interests of potential intervenors is “whether each of the dual interests [of the party] may ‘always dictate precisely the same approach to the conduct of the litigation.’ 404 U.S. 539.” *United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co.*, 819 F.2d at 475 (holding that the largest mortgage holder could intervene of right in case brought after collapse of real estate firm because the trustee could not adequately protect the interests of such holder given the trustee’s duty to represent all holders with equal vigor). Consequently, even if the United States vigorously performs its duty to represent its citizenry, representation of

applicants' distinct interests may still be inadequate because defendant United States must balance the competing interests presented by the proposed intervenors as well as those individuals or entities, like the plaintiff, who oppose it. While the interests of the United States and applicants may converge on issues such as the impact of Georgia's voter verification process and the constitutionality of Section 5, they may diverge when it comes to arguments to be made and deciding to appeal any adverse decisions. For other decisions holding that government parties could not adequately represent the interests of a subset of the general public, *see Chiles v. Thornburgh*, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1989) (federal prison detainees' interests may not be adequately represented by county); *Dimond v. District of Columbia*, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (private party seeking to protect narrow financial interest allowed to intervene despite presence of government which represented general public interest); *Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency*, 99 F.R.D. 607, 610 n.5 (D.D.C. 1983) (pesticide manufacturers and industry representatives allowed to intervene even though EPA was a party); *New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York*, 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2nd Cir. 1975) (pharmacists and pharmacy association allowed to intervene where "there is a likelihood that the pharmacists will make a more vigorous presentation of the economic side of the argument than would" the state Regents); *Associated General Contractors of Connecticut, Inc. v. City of New Haven*, 130 F.R.D. 4, 11-12 (D. Conn. 1990) (minority contractors allowed to intervene because "its interest in the set-aside is compelling economically and thus distinct from that of the City").

The inability of the Attorney General to adequately represent the interests of applicants is apparent from the fact that in *Morales v. Kemp* the United States and the plaintiffs took

significantly different positions on the remedy for the Section 5 violation. Plaintiffs, including the Georgia NAACP, argued, *inter alia*, that a permanent injunction should be entered following the objection by the Attorney General to Georgia's voter verification procedure, while the United States argued that the preliminary injunction entered by the three-judge court should remain in effect permitting partial implementation of the objected-to change. These different positions are reflected in the following attached documents: Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Response to Court's April 30, 2010 Scheduling Order, May 10, 2010, attached as Exhibit B; and Response of Amicus Curiae United States to the Court's Questions in April 30, 2010 Scheduling Order, May 10, 2010, attached as Exhibit C.

Applicants meet the standards for intervention as of right, and their motion should be granted.

III. Permissive Intervention Is Also Appropriate

Even if this Court should determine that applicants do not satisfy the requirements for intervention of right, it should grant permissive intervention under Rules 24(b)(1)(A) and (B). As noted above, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4) provides that any aggrieved party may intervene at any stage of an action to bail out from Section 5 coverage.


Rule 24(b)(1)(B) also permits intervention upon timely application by anyone who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Applicants oppose preclearance of Georgia's voter verification process because it has a disparate impact upon racial and language minorities. As discussed above, applicants seek to defend the constitutionality of Section 5. Applicants thus have claims and defenses that share common factual and legal questions with the main action. Also as discussed above, intervention will not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights" Rule 24(b)(3).

In *Arizona v. California*, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), Indian tribes were permitted to intervene in a water rights action between states, despite intervention by the United States on behalf of the tribes. The Court reasoned that “the Indians’ participation in litigation critical to their welfare should not be discouraged.” *Id.* at 615. The pending litigation is no less critical to movant’s welfare, and accordingly intervention should be granted.

IV. Conclusion

For the above and foregoing reasons, the Court should permit the applicants to intervene in this action as party defendants.

Respectfully submitted,



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EXHIBIT A

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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Civil Action No. 10-1062 (ESH-HHK)

[PROPOSED] ANSWER OF APPLICANTS FOR INTERVENTION TO COMPLAINT

Tyrone Brooks, Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials, Edward O. DuBose, Georgia State Conference NAACP, Helen Butler, and Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda ("Intervenor-Defendants"), hereby answer each of the numbered paragraphs of the Complaint (Docket # 1) filed by the Plaintiff in the above-styled action as follows:

Answers to Allegations

1. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 1 to the extent that they describe the statutory basis asserted by Plaintiff for the claims presented in the Complaint.

2. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 2 to the extent that the Voting Rights Act authorizes the State of Georgia to bring claims seeking Section 5 preclearance before this Court. Intervenor-Defendants deny that either the Voting Rights Act or 28 U.S.C. 2201 authorizes the State of Georgia to bring the claims presented in the Complaint on behalf of the citizens of the State of Georgia.

3. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 3, except to the extent that Paragraph 3 suggests that only Defendant Holder may defend a Section 5 declaratory judgment action in this Court. Intervenor-Defendants aver that citizens of plaintiff jurisdictions frequently participate as parties in defense of Section 5 declaratory judgment actions.

4. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 4 to the extent that they accurately quote portions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, but deny that Paragraph 4 faithfully quotes the governing provisions of Section 5. Specifically, Intervenor-Defendants aver that Paragraph 4 omits the statutory requirement that a proposed voting change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, *or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title . . .*” (emphasis added to omitted material).

5. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 5.

6. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 6 to the extent that Georgia is a covered jurisdiction for purposes of Section 5 pursuant to the determination of August 7, 1965 in 30 F.R. 9897.

7. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 7 to the extent that they describe the statutory basis asserted by Plaintiff for the claims presented in the Complaint and characterize Plaintiff's contentions. Intervenor-Defendants deny that Plaintiff is prevented by Section 5 from enforcing federal laws relating to voter registration and verification.

8. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 8. Intervenor-Defendants aver that an actual controversy exists between the parties only with respect to whether Plaintiff can meet its burden of proof on its Section 5 claim or whether, in the alternative, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief upon its constitutional claim.

9. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 9.

10. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 10.

Verification Requirements under Federal Law

11. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 11 except to the extent that the allegations refer to "minimum election standards" while the preamble of the act refers to "minimum election *administration* standards" (emphasis added).

12. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 12 to the extent that they accurately quote portions of the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"). The allegations do not, however, quote other relevant sections of HAVA.

13. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 13 to the extent that they accurately quote portions of HAVA.

14. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 14 to the extent that they accurately quote portions of HAVA.

15. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. The *Schwier* consent decree and HAVA speak for themselves. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 15 to the extent that they accurately cite *Schwier v. Cox* and accurately quote portions of HAVA.

16. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. The *Schwier* consent decree and HAVA speak for themselves. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 16.

17. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. The *Schwier* consent decree and HAVA speak for themselves. If deemed to allege facts, upon information and belief Intervenor-Defendants deny that Georgia “collected full Social Security numbers from each registrant” prior to the *Schwier* decision.

Communications with the Department of Justice

18. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 18. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 18 to the extent they contend that the procedures at issue in this action are “required under Section 303(a)(5).”

19. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in this paragraph to the extent that the Chief of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division at the United States Department of

Justice sent Georgia a letter dated April 23, 2007 concerning whether Georgia was “online through the HAVA verification program for matching the last four digits of social security numbers against the SSA database.” Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 19.

20. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in this paragraph to the extent that Georgia began performing record matching between the statewide voter registration database and the DDS database in or around June 2007, but deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 20. Upon information and belief, Intervenor-Defendants aver that in September 2008 Georgia officials first directed county boards of registrars to prevent persons appearing on the citizenship “exceptions report” from voting.

21. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 21 to the extent that they describe aspects of the procedures Plaintiff identifies as the “Georgia HAVA Verification Process.” Intervenor-Defendants deny that the allegations of Paragraph 21 provide a complete description of the proposed process. Intervenor-Defendants aver that the proposed uses of “exception list[s]” for which Plaintiff seeks Section 5 preclearance are not required by HAVA and that it is misleading to refer to those procedures as a component of “HAVA Verification.” Intervenor-Defendants further aver that the citizenship matching and hearing procedures for which Plaintiff seeks Section 5 preclearance are not required by HAVA and that it is misleading to refer to those procedures as a component of “HAVA Verification.”

22. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 22. Intervenor-Defendants aver that the October 8, 2008 letter from the Department of Justice to then-Secretary of State Karen Handel informed the State that “[b]ecause election officials exercise substantial discretion at many points in this process of attempting to verify voter registration information

and in acting upon the results of that process, these changes affecting voting are covered by the requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.”

23. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 23. Intervenor-Defendants aver that on October 9, 2008, Jose Morales, a resident of Cherokee County, Georgia, brought a Section 5 enforcement action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against then-Secretary of State Karen Handel, stating claims under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act, and that Mr. Morales was represented by attorneys including the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Intervenor-Defendants further aver that the *Morales* Complaint was later amended to add plaintiffs and to state a claim under HAVA. Intervenor-Defendants further aver that the citizenship matching and hearing procedures that formed the basis of Mr. Morales’ Section 5 claim were not and are not required by HAVA and that it is misleading to refer to those procedures as a component of “HAVA Verification.”

24. Upon information and belief, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations in this paragraph to the extent that the Chief of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division at the United States Department of Justice sent Georgia a letter dated October 10, 2008, concerning Georgia’s Social Security Administration records matching.

25. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 25 with respect to assertions by the Department of Justice. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 25 to the extent that a Section 5 submission by the Georgia Attorney General was made on October 14, 2008, which sought preclearance for certain voter registration procedures based upon matching of the Georgia statewide voter registration database

and the Georgia DDS database. Intervenor-Defendants deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 25, specifically that the procedures identified in Plaintiff's Complaint as the "Georgia HAVA Verification Process" were fully contained in the Georgia Attorney General's October 14, 2008 submission.

26. Intervenor-Defendants deny that the procedures identified in Plaintiff's Complaint as the "Georgia HAVA Verification Process" were fully contained in the Georgia Attorney General's October 14, 2008 submission but admit the remaining allegations of Paragraph 26.

27. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 27 except to the extent that this paragraph incorporates the term "temporary HAVA verification process." Intervenor-Defendants aver that the Morales Court described its Order as "temporary remedy for the lack of preclearance, unless and until preclearance is obtained" and not as a "temporary HAVA verification process" as alleged in Paragraph 27.

28. Intervenor-Defendants deny that the procedures identified in Plaintiff's Complaint as the "Georgia HAVA Verification Process" were fully contained in the Georgia Attorney General's October 14, 2008 submission but admit the remaining allegations of Paragraph 28.

29. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 29.

30. The allegations in this paragraph contain statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit that the United States Attorney General interposed a Section 5 objection to the Georgia Attorney General's submission on May 29, 2009, but deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 30. Intervenor-Defendants aver that this action is a *de novo* proceeding in which Plaintiff bears the burden of proof without regard to the Section 5 administrative review process.

31. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 31. Intervenor-Defendants aver that Plaintiffs in the *Morales* litigation were aware that discussions occurred between the Department of Justice and the Georgia Attorney General with respect to the Section 5 submission but did not participate in those discussions.

32. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of this paragraph to the extent that the United States Department of Justice sent Georgia the letter dated June 16, 2009, attached as Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's Complaint, but deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 32.

33. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 33.

34. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph to the extent that a revised process "took into account the issues specifically stated by DOJ during those discussions" but admit the remainder of the allegations of Paragraph 34.

35. Intervenor-Defendants admit that on October 13, 2009, the Department of Justice denied the Georgia Attorney General's request for reconsideration of the May 29, 2009 objection, and identified a portion of Georgia's August 11, 2009 correspondence to be a new Section 5 submission. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph concerning what the Department of Justice had advised before October 13, 2009, and deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 35.

36. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 36.

37. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 37.

38. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 38, but deny that the "Georgia HAVA Verification Process" was fully contained in the state's Section 5 submission.

39. Intervenor-Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 39.

40. Intervenor-Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations of Paragraph 40.

41. The allegations in this paragraph are statements of law and/or conclusions of law to which no response is required. The Court's June 15, 2010 order in the *Morales* case speaks for itself. If deemed to allege facts, Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 41 to the extent that they distinguish between the citizenship-related procedures at issue in the *Morales* case and other procedures at issue in this action, and deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 41.

Expedited Consideration

42. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 42.

43. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 43.

44. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 44.

45. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 45 to the extent that they describe the relief sought by Plaintiff. Intervenor-Defendants deny that Plaintiff is entitled to expedited consideration of its claims. Intervenor-Defendants aver that Plaintiff has been dilatory both in seeking Section 5 preclearance from the Department of Justice and in bringing this action. Intervenor-Defendants further aver that any expedited consideration of Plaintiff's Section 5 preclearance claim should not foreshorten the opportunity for full discovery and briefing of Plaintiff's constitutional claim.

The Georgia HAVA Verification Process Sought to be Preleared

46. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 46 to the extent that they describe the relief sought by Plaintiff and the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations of Paragraph 46.

47. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 47.

48. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 48 to the extent that they describe the relief sought by Plaintiff and the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future, but deny that the procedures described in this paragraph are reasonably calculated to verify the identities of voter registration applicants.

49. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 49 to the extent that the procedures to which this paragraph refers do not on their face distinguish on the basis of race or color. Intervenor-Defendants aver that the procedures to which this paragraph refers bear more heavily on racial and language minority citizens.

50. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 50 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future.

Verification Process for Covered Applicants Who Provide a Georgia Driver's License Number or Georgia DDS ID Card

51. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 51 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to conduct a "citizenship status" match and aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

52. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 52 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to perform an “exact match” and aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

53. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 53 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to prepare an “exceptions report” and aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

54. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 54 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to provide an “exceptions report” to county boards of registrars and aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

Verification Process for Covered Applicants Who Provide Only Last Four Digits of Social Security Number

55. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 55 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future.

56. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 56 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future.

57. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 57 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future.

58. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 58 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to prepare an “exceptions report” and aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

59. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 59 to the extent that they describe the procedures Plaintiff purports to implement in the future. Intervenor-Defendants deny that any federal law requires Georgia to provide an “exceptions report” to county boards of registrars or requires such a report to be used for any purpose; Intervenor-Defendants aver that the decision to do so was and is entirely a discretionary choice on the part of Georgia state officials.

United States Citizenship Verification Process

60. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 60 to the extent that they set forth Plaintiff’s own description of the citizenship verification process for which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, and otherwise deny the remainder of the allegations in this paragraph. Upon information and belief, including reference to the actual practices implemented by Georgia without Section 5 preclearance, Intervenor-Defendants aver that this paragraph is a materially incomplete description of the purported citizenship verification procedures that Georgia would employ if Section 5 preclearance were granted by this Court.

61. Intervenor-Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 61 to the extent that they set forth Plaintiff’s own description of the citizenship verification process for which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, and otherwise deny the remainder of the allegations in